We provide a class of bound entangled states that have positive distillable secure key rate. The smallest state of this kind is 4 ⊗ 4. Our class is a generalization of the class presented in [1] . It is much wider, containing, in particular, states from the boundary of PPT entangled states (all of the states in the class in [1] were of this kind) but also states inside the set of PPT entangled states, even, approaching the separable states. This generalization comes with a price: for the wider class a positive key rate requires, in general, apart from the one-way Devetak-Winter protocol (used in [1]) also the recurrence preprocessing and thus effectively is a two-way protocol. We also analyze the amount of noise that can be admixtured to the states of our class without losing key distillability property which may be crucial for experimental realization. The wider class contains key-distillable states with higher entropy (up to 3.524, as opposed to 2.564 for the class in [1]).
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum cryptography, pioneered by Wiesner [2] , allows to obtain cryptographic key based on physical impossibility of eavesdropping. Namely, if the transmitted signal is encoded into quantum states, then by reading it, eavesdropper always introduces noise into the signal. Thus Alice and Bob -the parties who want to communicate privately -can measure the level of noise and detect whether their transmission is secure (even if the noise was solely due to eavesdropping). There are two types of quantum key distribution protocols: prepare and measure (as the original BB84 protocol [3] ) and protocols based on a shared entangled state (originated from the Ekert's protocol [4] ). For quite a time security proofs of prepare and measure protocols had been based on showing equivalence to the distillation (by local operations and classical communication) of maximally entangled states (the first such proof is due to Shor and Preskill [5] ). It have led to a belief that security of the quantum cryptography is always connected to the distillation of the maximally entangled states (this issue was perhaps first touched by Gisin and Wolf [6] ).
This belief suggested that one could not obtain secure key from bound entangled states [7] , i.e., states from which maximally entangled states cannot be distilled. On the contrary, the key-distillable bound entangled states have been found [8] and examples of low dimensional states have been provided [1] . The multipartite case was also considered [9] . There are two approaches to obtaining cryptographic key from bound entangled PPT states: one is based on approximating private bit with a PPT state [8, 10] and the other one -on mixing orthogonal private bits [1] . This paper continues on the second approach. The low dimensional key-distillable states with positive partial transpose [31] (hence, bound entangled) presented in [1] were lying on the boundary of PPT states and existence of the key-distillable states inside of PPT states was argued by the continuity argument, without giving the explicit form of those inner states. In this paper we present a wider class of PPT entangled key-distillable states including states inside the set of PPT states even approaching the set of separable states. We analyze properties of this class, as well as provide some more general criteria of key distillability, by exploiting criterion provided in [11] . This criterion was earlier applied to analyze some PPT states in [12] (see also [13] in this context).
The motivation behind the search for new bound entangled states with distillable key, is two-fold. First of all, there is a fundamental open question, whether from all entangled states one can draw secure key. To approach this question, one needs, in particular, to gather more phenomenology on the issue of drawing key from bound entangled states. In this paper, we have pushed this question a bit by showing explicitly that PPT keydistillable states can be in the interior of PPT states, even, approaching the set of separable states. Also, our general criterion of key distillability can serve for searching to what extent entanglement can provide for secure key.
Another motivation comes from recent experiments, where bound entanglement was implemented in labs [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] . In the experiments, usually, a four-partite bound entangled Smolin state was used, which allows for a number of non-classical effects being manifestations of true entanglement content of such state. We believe that lowdimensional bound entangled key-distillable states are also good candidates for experimental implementation, providing a non-classical effect -possibility of distilling secure key. This requires states which are robust against noise, to facilitate the process of preparing them in a lab.
In this paper, we analyze robustness of key-distillable states as well as provide very noisy states, having, in particular, relatively large entropy (c.a. 3.5 bits versus 4 bits of maximal possible entropy). Last but not least, the key-distillable bound entangled states are strictly related to the effect of superactivation of quantum capacity [19] , and our class may be further analyzed in this respect (in this paper, we have provided some exemplary calculations).
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II we review basic facts about general theory of distillation of secure key from quantum states of [10] . In particular, we describe technique called the privacy squeezing. In Sec. III we introduce our class of states which are PPT and keydistillable. We verify that they lie inside the set of PPT states, touching the set of separable states. Moreover, we check robustness of the property of key-distillability. We also give the explicit form of an important subset of our states as mixtures of pure states in Sec. IV). In Secs. V and VI we examine entropic properties of our states and their relation with Smith-Yard superactivation of quantum capacity phenomenon. Finally, in Sec. VII, we provide a general sufficient condition for distilling private key from quantum states of local dimension not less than 4.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Let us first recall some important concepts of classical key distillation from quantum states, covered in detail in [10] .
A general state containing at least one bit of perfectly secure key is called the private bit or pbit [10] . A private bit in its so-called X-form is given by
where X is an arbitrary operator satisfying X = 1 (here and throughout the paper, we use the trace norm, that is the sum of the singular values of an operator For a general state with ABA ′ B ′ subsystems (i.e., not necessarily a private bit) one can infer possibility of distillation of private key using the method called the privacy squeezing [10] . Namely, we consider the following type of protocols: one measures the key part in the standard basis and classically process the outcomes (cf. [11] for two-qubit states). Given a protocol of this type we would like to know whether it can distill key from the state. To this end, we construct a two qubit state in the following way: one applies to the original state the socalled twisting operation, i.e., a unitary transformation of the following form
and perform partial trace over A ′ B ′ . Now, it turns out that if we apply the protocol to the original state we obtain no less key than we would obtain from the above two qubit state using the same protocol.
Therefore, if we apply a cleverly chosen twisting, we may infer key-distillability of the original state, by examining a two-qubit state (i.e., a much simpler object). This technique is called the privacy squeezing. The role of twisting is to 'squeeze' the privacy present in the original state into its key part, where it is then more easily detectable, e.g., by protocols designed for two-qubit states (see e.g., [11, 20, 21] ).
To explain why the two qubit state cannot give more key than the original state (within the considered class of protocols) we invoke the following result of [10] . One considers a state of three systems: a quantum one -Eve's system and two classical ones -the registers holding the outcomes of measurement of the key part (the state is therefore called a ccq state). Now, it turns out that twisting does not change this state. However, in the considered class of protocols Alice and Bob use only classical registers, so the output of such protocols depends solely on the ccq state. Thus the key obtained with and without twisting is exactly the same. This holds, even though twisting is a non-local operation and the resulting state can be more powerful under all other respects (such as drawing key by some other type of protocols). Next, if we additionally trace out the shield, i.e., the subsystem A ′ B ′ , this means that the resulting ccq state differs from the original ccq state only by Eve having, in addition, the shield. Thus, if any key can be obtained from it, it can only be less secure than the key obtained from the original ccq state.
It turns out that for any 'spider' state, i.e., state of the form
(where we have omitted zero blocks for clarity) there exists such a twisting operation that the matrix elements of the two qubit state, obtained by tracing out the A ′ B ′ subsystem after applying the twisting, are equal to trace norms of the corresponding blocks in the original state:
(we use here that A = A † for trace norm). This twisting is in a sense optimal for the spider states. We call the two qubit state (5) the privacy-squeezed state of the original state. If a spider state satisfies C = C ′ and E = E ′ than its privacy-squeezed state is a Bell diagonal state.
For a deeper discussion of the privacy squeezing see [10] , although the name spider state is not used there.
III. DISTILLING KEY FROM PPT MIXTURES OF PRIVATE STATES
Here, we construct a class of bound entangled states which are key-distillable. They are mixtures of four orthogonal private bits of some special form. We provide a sufficient condition to distill cryptographic key from our class. The condition given in this section is generalized to an arbitrary state in Sec. VII.
A. Definition of the class
Let us consider a class of states
which is a mixture of four orthogonal private bits which could be considered analogues to the Bell states. The construction is possible in dimension 2d ⊗ 2d, with d ≥ 2.
The four private bits are given by
where σ A x is a Pauli matrix σ x applied on subsystem A, and by γ(X) we mean a private bit written in its X-form (1).
States given by (6) and (7) have the block matrix form (4) given on figure 1. Definition 1. We define the class C as the class of states given by (6) and (7) with operators X and Y related by
where superscript Γ denotes the partial transposition in Alice versus Bob cut; and satisfying the following conditions: the diagonal blocks of (4), i.e., operators
(The relation (8) and PPT-invariance of the diagonal blocks are necessary to obtain simple conditions for the state to be PPT, given in Sec. III B).
In particular, the PPT-invariance of the diagonal blocks holds for
where u ij are elements of some unitary matrix on C d and
For the operator X given by (9) we have
where the minimum is achieved for the unimodular unitary [1] and maximum for the identity matrix. We will sometimes write ̺ U to denote the subclass of the class C with operator X given by (9) or to stress using a concrete unitary in the definition of X, in particular, we will consider the subclass ̺ H where u ij are elements of the Hadamard unitary matrix.
In case of d = 2 we will also consider the subclass of the class C with operators X and Y given by
where
u ij |ii jj|.
Unitaries U 1 and U 2 must have the same global phase, i.e., α 1 = α 2 in the parametrization of a single qubit unitary given by (72) in the appendix. In particular, one may take
We also use an alternative parametrization in terms of p, α, and β given by
On the other hand, the original parameters λ i can be expressed using p, α, and β as follows:
Both parametrizations are directly related with the privacy-squeezed version of the state given by C and (7), and constructed according to the formula (5):
where the Bell states ψ i are given by
Thus, λ i are the eigenvalues of the privacy-squeezed state, p reports the balance between correlations and anti-correlations, while α and β report how coherences are damped. A subclass of the class C with X defined by (9) has been considered in [1] :
The class C is much wider then (21), in particular, it contains key-distillable PPT states arbitrary close to the separable states, but this comes with a price: we have to, in general, use the recurrence preprocessing to obtain positive key rate for C while for (21) the sole DevetakWinter protocol is enough [1] .
B. Sufficient PPT conditions
For the states of the class C to be PPT (so that maximal entanglement cannot be distilled from them) it is sufficient to satisfy the following conditions
In particular, if p =λ 1 whereλ 1 is given by (27) , we have
For the subclass (21), the above PPT conditions collapse to a single PPT-invariant state, on the boundary of PPT states, which satisfies
C. Key distillability
We shall derive here a general sufficient condition for key-distillability of the spider states with a Bell diagonal privacy-squeezed state, which easily follows from combining the privacy squeezing technique with the result of [11] on key distillation from two-qubit states. It is enough for our purposes, as states of our class are of that form. (In Sec. VII we shall extend the key-distillability condition to arbitrary states by exploiting twirling). Proposition 1. Let ̺ be a state of the form
satisfying C = C ′ and E = E ′ , i.e., ̺ is a state having a Bell diagonal privacy-squeezed state. If
then Alice and Bob can distill cryptographic key by first measuring the key part of many copies of the state ̺ and than using the recurrence [22, 23] and the DevetakWinter protocol [24] .
Remark 1. Note that, interestingly, the condition (29) is equivalent to requiring that one of the matrices
is not a positive one.
Remark 2. Note that the right-hand side of Eq. (29) can also be written as p e (1 − p e ) where p e is the probability of error (i.e. anticorrelation) when key part is measured in standard basis.
Proof of the proposition 1. We apply the privacy squeezing technique described in Sec. II, i.e., we show that the privacy-squeezed state of ̺ is key-distillable by a protocol based on measuring the state locally in the standard basis and classical postprocessing. This implies ̺ is also key-distillable.
The privacy-squeezed state is precisely of the form (5) with C = C ′ and E = E ′ , i.e., it is a Bell diagonal state which can be written as
For such a state it was shown in [11] that if max(|d|, |f |) > √ ae then one can distill key by measuring the state locally in the standard basis, and processing the resulting classical data (actually, by using the recurrence followed by the Devetak-Winter protocol). This is precisely the type of protocols allowed by the privacy-squeezing technique described in Sec. II. In our case, the above conditions are simply the ones given in (29) .
Due to the form (19) of the privacy-squeezed state of the states from our class, we immediately obtain suitable conditions: Corollary 1. Let ̺ be a state defined by formulas C and (7) with arbitrary X and Y satisfying X = Y = 1. If
or equivalently if
then Alice and Bob can distill cryptographic key by first measuring the key part of many copies of the state ̺ and than using the recurrence and the Devetak-Winter protocol.
Corollary 1 also holds if one uses |λ 3 − λ 4 | as the lefthand side of (32) or equivalently |β| as the left-hand side of (33), however, in our paper, we do not use these conditions.
Observation 1. For a state of the class C to be both PPT and key distillable using corollary 1 it must satisfy both (24) and (33). For a given value of the parameter p there exist α satisfying both conditions iff p ∈ ( 1 2 , p max ) where 
D. Tolerable white noise
We say that δ is the tolerable noise of a key distillation protocol for a state ̺ if for any ε < δ the state ̺ ε with ε of the white noise admixtured
remains key-distillable with that protocol. Having p > 1 2 , the tolerable noise of the DevetakWinter protocol with the recurrence preprocessing for the class C is given by
In particular for a key-distillable PPT state̺ H with λ 1 =λ 1 whereλ 1 is given by (27) the tolerable noise for the Devetak-Winter protocol with the recurrence preprocessing (36) is approximately equal to 0.155 while for the sole Devetak-Winter protocol it is approximately equal to 0.005, i.e., it is 31 times smaller. See figure 2.
E. Separability
Given a state ̺ U of the class C with X given by (9) and d = 2, i.e., ̺ is a state of 4 ⊗ 4 system, we may try to decompose ̺ into a mixture of four two qubit states. The particular decomposition, which we propose below, is possible if |β| ≤ X Γ .
All of the four two qubit states in our decomposition are Bell diagonal states with the same set of eigenvalues. Thus, the two qubit states are separable (and, hence, ̺ is separable) if all their eigenvalues are less than or equal to 1 2 [32] . For our decomposition this happens if, additionally to (38), the following conditions are satisfied
or equivalently, additionally to (40), the following conditions are satisfied
Note that conditions (43) and (45) are identical to the PPT conditions for ̺ given by (23) and (25), respectively. The decomposition into the four two qubit states has the form
where u ij are the elements of the unitary matrix on C 2 used to define operator X in (9), u is given by (10) , and ̺ ij denote the two qubit states given by (39) on figure 3 where φ ij comes from the polar decomposition of u ij
The local basis of Alice and Bob for each of the two qubit states are given in (46) in parenthesis.
F. PPT key arbitrary close to separability
One can obtain key from some 4 ⊗ 4 PPT states lying arbitrary close to the set of separable states. That is, one can easily select a single parameter subclass of the class C satisfying PPT conditions and approaching some separable state with p = 1 2 such that for any other state in this class, no matter how close to the separable state, the key condition (33) is satisfied. Note that if we chose a separable state with p = 1 2 as the final state the key condition would be violated before reaching that final state; thus, we would not approach with the keydistillable states arbitrary close to the set of separable states.
Such a class of states, a subclass of ̺ H , is illustrated in figure 4 . The dashed line represents the subclass̺ H , given by (21), a mixture of two pbits (γ + 1 and γ + 2 ) which in alternate parametrization is equivalent to p ∈ [0, 1] and α = β = 1. As shown in [1] , this class contains exactly one (boundary) PPT entangled state obtained by setting p =λ 1 whereλ 1 is given by (27) , otherwise the states are NPT.
The solid line represents a class of PPT key-distillable states obtained by setting p ∈ ( 1 2 , p max ), α = min(1, α 1 ), and β = min(1, α
] the class is represented as a straight line from the PPT state of the previous class̺ H on one end (p =λ 1 ) and approaches arbitrary close to the separable state ̺ sep (p = 1 2 ) on the other end. In the range p ∈ [λ 1 , p max ) the states are PPT-invariant and lie on the boundary of PPT entangled states, they are represented as an arc from the PPT state of the previous class̺ H on one end (p =λ 1 ) and approach arbitrary close to the state ̺ max (p = p max ) on the other end. In the range p ∈ (λ 1 , p max ) one could take α < α 1 , such that the key condition (33) is still satisfied, to enter inside the class of PPT states. (24) and (25) and the key condition (33), and prepare a corresponding PPT key-distillable state from the class ̺ H which has the form
IV. STATES ̺H AS MIXTURES
where the Bell states ψ i are given by (20) and the correlated states are the following:
where P ψ denotes the projector onto a pure state ψ and
V. MAXIMIZING VON NEUMANN ENTROPY
In this section, we find 4 ⊗ 4 key-distillable PPT states with a quite high von Neumann entropy for two subclasses of the class C and summarize the results in a table.
A. For states of the class ̺U Here, we find the supremum of the von Neumann entropy of the subclass ̺ U of the class C with X given by (9) consisting of states that are both PPT and key-distillable by corollary 1. Let as denote this set of states as PK d , subscripted with the dimension of the unitary used to define operator X.
As ̺ is a mixture of four orthogonal private bits its von Neumann entropy is given by
and the maximal value in (56) is achieved if the unitary used to define X in (9) is unimodular. A unimodular unitary also maximizes the allowed range of p given by observation 1, as it achieves minimum of X Γ . Hence, to maximize the entropy, it is enough to consider a unimodular unitary. The supremum is achieved for a state with p = p max , β = 0, and α = 1−p p (which no longer satisfies our key-distillability condition) thus
where p max = (1 + X Γ 2 ) −1 comes from observation 1. In particular, for d = 2, i.e., ̺ being 4 ⊗ 4 states, the supremum is achieved for state having p = p max = 2/3 which gives
The supremum corresponds to a state ̺ max on figure 4 but with β = 0.
B. For states of a class larger than ̺U
For the subclass ̺ of the class C with d = 2 and X and Y given by (12), we are able to obtain
for U 1 = U 2 = H, q ≈ 0.683, β = 0 and α, p taken as in the previous subsection. It seems to be the supremum of the von Neumann entropy for this selection of operators X and Y .
C. Summary
Here, we summarize the results of maximizing von Neumann entropy of 4 ⊗ 4 key-distillable PPT states in the following table:
S(̺) ̺ satisfying PPT and key conditions 2.564 class̺ from [1] with p =λ 1 , the maximum is achieved for U = H 3.319 class ̺ U , the supremum is described in Sec. V A 3.524 class C with Y given by (12), a supposed supremum is described in Sec. V B
VI. DISTILLABILITY VIA ERASURE CHANNEL
In [19] , it was shown that two zero capacity channels, if combined together, can have nonzero capacity. One of the channels was related (through so called ChoiJamiołkowski (CJ) isomorphism) to a bound entangled but key-distillable state, while the other was a so called symmetrically extendable channel. In particular, they considered an example, where the first channel had 4 ⊗ 4 CJ state from the class (21) while the second one was the 50%-erasure channel. In [25] a simpler scheme was proposed, which also allows to observe this curious phenomenon.
The second approach amounts to sending a subsystem A ′ of a state defined on systems ABA ′ B ′ through the 50%-erasure channel and checking the coherent information of the resulting state. If it is positive one concludes that the capacity of combined channel is also positive. Here, we shall use this approach to see how the presence of coherence β influence the phenomenon.
Coherent information after sending the A ′ subsystem through the 50%-erasure channel is given by
where S, S A ′ BB ′ , and S BB ′ are given by (55), (62), and (63), respectively. For a PPT state̺ given by (21) with X given by (9) and based on unimodular unitary and λ 1 =λ 1 , wherẽ λ 1 is given by (27) , the coherent information is positive starting from d = 11. For a similar state of our class with p =λ 1 , α = 1 and β = 0 the coherent information is positive starting from d = 22.
Formulas for S A ′ BB ′ and S BB ′ are as follows:
VII. CONDITION FOR DRAWING SECURE KEY FROM GENERAL STATES
From Sec. III C, we have a sufficient condition for drawing key in terms of norms of the nonzero blocks from states having a Bell diagonal privacy-squeezed state. In this section, we generalize that condition to the case of an arbitrary state.
Let us define two twirling operations (cf. [23] )
and one twirling with flags
whereÛ ̺ = U ̺U † , X and Z are Pauli matrices. Now, we give a sufficient condition to obtain key from a general state.
Proposition 2. For an arbitrary state
then Alice and Bob can distill cryptographic key by first applying twirling Λ ′ XX • Λ ZZ to the key part and measuring the key part of many copies of the state ̺ and than using the recurrence and the Devetak-Winter protocol.
Remark 3. Note that the right-hand side of Eq. (68) can also be written as 1 2 p e (1 − p e ) where p e is the probability of error (i.e. anticorrelation) when key part is measured in standard basis.
Proof of the proposition 2. Alice and Bob first apply twirling Λ ′ XX • Λ ZZ (an LOCC operation) to the key part and obtain the following state
This state is now of the spider form and, thanks to flags, we have direct sums within the blocks. Now, the privacysqueezed state has the following Bell diagonal form Note also, that in the proof, we have first applied twirling with flags to the original state, and then the privacy-squeezing operation. Actually, the same state would be obtained if we first apply the privacy squeezing and then apply (standard) twirling. This is illustrated by the following diagram where P sq stands for the privacy squeezing. As explained above, this diagram would not commute if we used solely twirling without flags. Thus, to seek for key-distillable states, one can go the alternative route, i.e., first compute the privacy-squeezed state, and then, by twirling, obtain a Bell diagonal state. Now, if Λ XX • Λ ZZ (σ) satisfies necessary security condition for realistic QKD on a Pauli channel from [11] , i.e., its eigenvalues λ i satisfy (32) , then ̺ is key-distillable using proposition 2.
VIII. APPENDIX
The parametrization of a single qubit unitary [26] : 
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